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9 September 1964



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


# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE  
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY

State Department review completed

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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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### DAILY BRIEF

\*South Vietnam: General Minh has been designated to resume, in effect, his previous role as nominal chief of state.


A decree issued on 8 September by the triumvirate of Generals Khanh, Minh, and Khiem delegated to Minh the power to appoint and receive ambassadors, to grant amnesty, and to promulgate decrees proposed by the government and countersigned by Premier Khanh. Minh also was made responsible for convening by the end of this month a national council to decide on a future provisional regime.

The status of several officers reportedly marked for transfer or assignment abroad under an extensive command reshuffle is still obscure. Yesterday, however, the commissioner for youth and sports, a civilian Dai Viet Party member, told the embassy that Khanh had removed three Dai Viet officers--the 7th Division commander, the National Police director, and the chief of Gia Dinh Province surrounding Saigon.

Khanh's actions so far in shaping his interim government accord generally with high-level Buddhist desires. Three members of the Buddhist hierarchy told the US Embassy last week that they backed Khanh, but felt that he should develop working relations with Minh who, though less able than Khanh, is popular because of his role in overthrowing Diem.

(continued)

Overall Buddhist objectives remain ambiguous. Although the Buddhist leaders have insisted to embassy officials that they are anti-Communist and antineutralist, they maintain that elimination of local corruption and of remnants of the Diem era are priority tasks for the government. An ambivalent editorial in the official Buddhist journal in Saigon appeals to the Communist Liberation Front "to stop the painful war," and asks the government to be sparing of lives in its "necessary operations."



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\*Congo-OAU: The OAU meeting in Addis Ababa now seems likely to result in a resolution that will somewhat enhance the status of the Congo rebels.

The radicals' incessant hammering away at Tshombé has begun to take effect. By playing on the widespread personal hostility to the Congolese premier because of his past record and his renewed resort to mercenaries they have put pressure on moderate spokesmen to prove they are not "stooges" of "foreign" interests.

Radical influence was reflected in the designation of four leading Tshombé antagonists--the representatives of Ghana, Mali, Tanganyika, and Kenya--to the seven nation drafting committee. The radicals are apparently prepared to split the OAU rather than accept a resolution which in any way implies OAU support for Tshombé.

So far, however, the radicals have not succeeded in imposing their demands for a subsequent OAU-supervised "round-table" gathering of all Congolese "factions." Haile Selassie's intervention yesterday to block such a call reflected the moderates' concern over language which would set a precedent for OAU intervention in any member's internal affairs.

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Turkey: Growing criticism of the government's Cyprus policy may force Prime Minister Inonu into a more inflexible position.

General parliamentary debate which began Monday on the Cyprus issue will probably result in a request for a vote of confidence later this week. This could result in Inonu's resignation or in the formation of a coalition. Even if Inonu weathers the attack, he will probably be forced to demonstrate popular displeasure with the United States.

The government reportedly is already reviewing some of its bilateral agreements with the US. Pressure will increase to threaten termination or limitation of some of the special concessions currently enjoyed by Americans in Turkey, including legal privileges under the status of forces relationship. [There is no indication as yet, however, that any of the major base rights agreements are under review.]

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West Germany: [There is some sentiment in Bonn for the Khrushchev visit to take place as soon as possible, perhaps before the US elections.]

[Chancellor Erhard's top assistant, Ludger Westrick, told Ambassador McGhee last week that he personally favored such an early meeting. He argued that it would not affect the US elections in any way.]

[It is not yet clear whether Westrick was reflecting Erhard's views, but McGhee sees several reasons why the two may wish to have Khrushchev come to West Germany within the next few weeks. They probably are anxious to stem any growth of controversy in West Germany over the visit. A meeting now would give Erhard a chance to play his trump card--offers of closer Soviet - West German economic ties--before the French-Soviet economic talks begin in November.

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[So far, the Foreign Ministry, which has been working toward an Erhard-Khrushchev visit in the spring, has received no word of a switch in plans. It also seems unlikely that Khrushchev will be able to fit a trip to Bonn into his schedule before next year.]

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India: The fall of the Congress Party government in Kerala provides an opportunity for Communist gains in the south Indian state.

By failing to win over Congress Party dissidents, the government lost a vote of confidence yesterday by a substantial margin--72 to 50. Local issues were responsible for the defections.

In an effort to achieve some measure of political stability before the scheduled state elections of next February, New Delhi is likely to impose its own direct--President's--rule. It fears that the Communists, who ruled Kerala from 1957 to 1959, might win any earlier elections. While delay may only postpone the day of reckoning, the Shastri government hopes that during the breather the Congress Party can patch up its quarrels while divisions in Communist ranks deepen.

Developments in Kerala are unrelated to the pro-forma vote of confidence which Prime Minister Shastri faces in New Delhi later this week. After the opposition there has had its opportunity to criticize the government's food and price policies, the Congress steam-roller will prevail as usual.

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Iraq: An abortive coup attempt by members of the Iraqi Baath Party on 4 September is likely to swing the regime further toward the Baath's chief enemy--Nasir. A large number of army officers suspected of complicity in the plot have already been arrested and the position of leading anti-Egyptian members of the regime may have been undermined. 9

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**NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE**

The United States Intelligence Board on 8 September 1964 approved the following national intelligence estimate:

SNIE 53-64, "Chances for a Stable Government  
in South Vietnam."

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**DAILY BRIEF**

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The Director, The Joint Staff

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The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

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